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This special issue of the journal is entirely devoted to subnational constitutionalism. 
To do so, it tries to adopt a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective and to identify 
constitutional patterns in those federal or regional contexts where subnational polities do 
not have a legal document formally called “constitution”. 
Some contributions have a national focus (on Belgium, Spain, Germany, Argentina, 
Ethiopia, and Macao). Other pieces, instead, consider the phenomenon from a 
comparative perspective, focusing on the external relations of subnational polities, the 
distinctive aspects of legislatures and legislative power at this institutional level, and the role 
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It is a pleasure for us to edit this special issue of Perspectives on Federalism which is 
entirely devoted to subnational constitutionalism. 
Subnational constitutionalism, in the words of one of the most important scholars in 
this field “is nothing more than the application of the principles of constitutionalism at the 
subnational level. An ideology of subnational constitutionalism accordingly conceives of 
state, provincial, or regional constitutions as charters of self-governance self-consciously 
adopted by subnational populations for the purpose of achieving a good life by effectively 
ordering subnational governmental power and by protecting the liberties of subnational 
citizens”I irrespective of the institutional form of the polity (whether federal, confederal, 
regional, etc). 
Subnational constitutionalism differs from the traditional definition given to federalism 
with regard to the “form” of the discipline concerning the protection of the constitutional 
goods protected at subnational level and insists on the distinction between constitution and 
constitutionalism. 
In other words: one may have subnational constitutionalism even in contexts where the 
subnational units (or polities) do not have a document formally called “constitution” 
(history is full of examples: Spain, Italy, Belgium etc). Another interesting distinction can 
be found: on the one side, there can be subnational fundamental charters that have 
constitutional ambitions without a formal constitutional status in the legal system, as 
happened in Italy or Spain. On the other side, there may be no legal documents at all, as is 
the case of (federalized) Belgium. 
Of course subnational constitutionalism requires at least “autonomy” (sovereignty 
seems to us a quite nostalgic notion in times of global interactions and interdependence) 
but it may be found even in contexts that are not stricto sensu federal. The rise of regional 
identities clearly plays a crucial role in the development of these processes, as Ilenia Ruggiu 
argues in her contribution. 
Starting from this assumption we gathered a good number of interesting contributions 
aimed at exploring this phenomenon from different angles and covering many geographic 
varieties (Africa, Asia, Europe, America(s). We also collected some contributions whose 
primary goal is to look into the topic from a comparative perspective. 
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The chemistry given by this combination seems to us promising and we hope that this 
special issue may contribute to focus attention on a scholarly trend which is indeed 
growing even beyond the US. 
We also had the honour to have an Introduction to this issue written by Prof. Robert 
Williams, Convenor of the IACL (International Association of Constitutional Law) 
research group on “Subnational Constitutions in Federal and Quasi-Federal Constitutional 
States”: it is indeed a pleasure and we would like to thank him also for his support to this 
initiative. 
As said at the beginning, one of the crucial questions addressed in this issue concerns 
the possibility to talk about subnational constitutionalism in contexts that are not 
characterized by a real “constitutional power” and the contribution by Patricia Popelier – 
devoted to the Belgian context – address this question by challenging some established 
views in this field. 
Spain and Italy are another two examples of this trend: in these legal orders the substate 
entities do not have fully fledged “constitutions” but despite this, their Basic Laws (that 
have experienced a round of reforms recently) are full of references to very demanding 
concepts like “fundamental rights” and “identity” (see again Ruggiu’s piece). 
Another important point is how the original federal model – entrenched in the 1787 
Constitution of Philadelphia – was “exported” to Latin America. Ricardo Ramírez Calvo 
provides us with an analysis of the specific features of Argentine federalism and provincial 
constitutionalism, their similarities with the U.S. model and some possible reasons for their 
eventual lamentable operation. 
Another feature of the literature in this field concerns the “cases” normally taken into 
account (US, Switzerland, to a lesser extent Canada, and other federal countries), while in 
this issue we are going to deal with other interesting – but usually neglected – experiences: 
African federalisms and Macao are emblematic from this point of view, as Yonatan Fessha 
and Paulo Cardinal and Yihe Zhang show in their excellent pieces. 
The former presents subnational constitutionalism as a “method” to improve the 
protection of national minorities, addressing the question of whether “the institutional 
design of states can be used to respond to the challenges of minorities within minorities”. 
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In the latter contribution the Authors investigate the nature and content of the Basic 
Laws of Hong Kong and Macau, which serve as subnational constitutions in these unique 
post-colonial contexts, offering a very detailed account. 
As for the disciplinary aspect, we have tried to avoid an exclusively legal focus. That is 
why one of the best-known cases of subnational constitutionalism – Landesverfassungen in 
Germany – has been dealt with by two political scientists, Astrid Lorenz and Werner 
Reutter, who have written a very interesting contribution on the “waves” of constitutional 
politics in the German Länder. 
Another focus in this special issue consists of the attention given to some selected 
matters that have been traditionally neglected at subnational level: the essay by Cristina 
Fasone is emblematic in this respect since it offers a fresh view on the theme of the 
balance of powers, particularly between the Legislative and the Executive branches, and the 
frame of government.  
Katia Blairon’s contribution deals with the particular features of legislative power in 
sub-national contexts, arguing that “the definition of the various characteristic elements of 
this legislative power influences the extent of regional constitutional power” itself. 
Another subject worthy of analysis is undoubtedly that of the external power of 
subnational entities. Actually, “foreign affairs have been traditionally seen as an exclusive 
competence of the central governments”, as Skoutaris writes at the beginning of his 
comparative overview focusing “on the treaty-making powers of the sub-state entities, the 
mechanisms that allow their participation in the foreign policy making of the central 
government and the implementation of the international treaties”. 
The last part of this issue is devoted to the role of judges in contexts of subnational 
constitutionalism with the essays written by Giuseppe Martinico and Giacomo Delledonne. 
The first piece analyses the role of lower courts in cases of conflicts between the 
principles of the subnational level and the constitution. The idea is that consistent 
interpretation may have a crucial role in solving the issue of legal conflicts. 
The second piece, instead, focuses on Constitutional Courts, analyzing the role of 
constitutional review and constitutional enforcement within subnational legal orders and its 
significance to the meaning of subnational constitutionalism and its fitness to be meant as 
subnational constitutional law. 
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